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Background
In keeping with the trend towards outsourcing and the focus of corporations on their
core competencies, the third-party logistics industry is on the ‘growth’ phase of its life-
cycle in the USi, Europeii, and elsewhere.  For our purposes, we employ Sink and
Langley’s characterization of third party logistics (3PL): “... using the services of an
external supplier to perform some or all of a firm’s logistics functions.”iii
Empirical research on 3PL contractsiv is emerging concomitantly.  The effectiveness of
any such contract, as well as its determinants, is receiving attention but only just.  Sink
and Langleyv propose a sequential, managerial framework for the effective acquisition
of logistics services that they gleaned from a variety of information sources (the
relevant literature, a focus group, eight case studies, and a survey) based in N. America
and Europe.  The respondents of the survey were senior logistics executives of
companies, some of whose apparently successful contracts with 3PL service providers
were publicized in the business and trade literature.
The framework proposed by Sink and Langleyvi is a sequence of the following five
steps: (1) identify need to outsource logistics; (2) develop feasible alternatives; (3)
evaluate and select supplier; (4) implement service; and (5) [conduct] ongoing service
assessment.  However, feedback loops between steps are possible.
The motivation for Sink and Langley’s investigation is that a framework thus gleaned
can “guide the purchasing process.”vii However, we are aware of at least one rather well
publicised 3PL contract in New Zealand with which both the client and the provider are
well-pleased although the client apparently departed from the framework in many ways.
(This contract, along with certain others engaged in by the provider, has received
attention in the New Zealand business press owing to the ‘win-win’ efficiency gains
realized by the provider through consolidation in distribution, which is especially
significant in New Zealand in light of its thin population density.)  For instance, the
client did not send out request for proposals (RFPs).  The origination of the contract
could be traced back to a certain gathering where the GM of the contract provider
happened to meet and converse, for the first time, with the CEO of the client’s
Australian parent.  According to a senior executive of the service provider, “they were
talking about what they did and the CEO said I have just taken over YYY.  He said how
would you like to take a look at XXX (a New Zealand subsidiary of YYY) - the place is
a shambles.  He was right. We put together a warehouse model and warehouse costs.
Then, we sat down and started talking about active issues and how we would handle
those issues.  Then, we talked about budgets and how we would put those budgets
together...” At no stage did the client look at alternative logistics providers: “We told
them this is what we are going to do and they evaluated it.”
In fact, Sink and Langley themselves note that in the contracts examined by them, the
buying process did not always follow the five-step sequence, which departure they
attributed to the influence of “the realities of power, conflict, and compromise”viii.  On
occasion, either a step was altogether omitted and/or it was initiated before its
predecessor had been completed in its entirety.  This observation would imply that
buying firms that do not employ the sequence gleaned could yet outsource logistics
successfully.
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Moreover, as the senior executive referred to earlier noted with regard to the client’s
refraining from a formal issuance of RFPs, “To be fair, at that stage in New Zealand, the
alternatives were limited.”  Whilst a formal survey of logistics utsourcing in NZ is
elusive, one local logistics specialist estimates the rate of local outsourcing at 15%.ix
This is well short of the proportions of companies in 1997 that used third-party logistics
services in Europe (84%) and North America (69%).x
Motivating the present study
The above implication was our point of departure for the present study: the
effectiveness of 3PL contracts and the determinants thereof could perhaps be
investigated in their own right, quite apart from the process by which the buying firms
acquired the services.  Indeed, the process of building theory from casesxi suggests one
should not focus exclusively on apparently successful contracts, an indicator of apparent
success being the disclosure of the workings of the contract in the open literature as in
Whirlpool’s contracting its inbound logistics to Ryderxii. ather, theoretical insight is
most likely engendered through the comparison of polar cases, which in the present
context would entail the comparison of highly successful and highly unsuccessful 3PL
contracts.
The need to pay attention to unsuccessful contracts is also expressed by Vincent
Gulisano, vice president of USCO Distribution Services which is a logistics service
provider operating nearly 10 million square feet of warehouse space throughout the US
and Mexico.  In a provocatively titled article (“Third-party failures: why keep it
Gulisano cites the “sobering” fact from a Warehousing and Research Council
pamphlet that 55% of logistics alliances are terminated after 3-5 years, and remarks that
“the problem is logistics service providers don’t talk about failure…  We need to openly
discuss and learn from past mistakes…”xiii  The high proportion of failures is confirmed
by a more recent survey conducted by the New York-based Outsourcing Institute: 55%
of third party partnerships fail within five yearsxiv.
The perspective of 3PL providers, such as USCO, on the determinants of successful
logistics relationships was examined by Leahy, Murphy, and Poistxv.  Based on rankings
returned by respondents (who were leading 3PL providers in the US), they listed a set of
determinants in descending order of importance.  Service attributes of the provider, such
as ‘customer orientation’ and ‘dependability,’ rated as more important determinants of
the effectiveness of the relationship (alliance) than the ‘cost savings’ realized by the
provider for its client.
Case study research has been deemed to be especially appropriate for gleaning
theoretical insight into a nascent empirical topic, such as the effectiveness of 3PL
contracts, of which comparatively little is knownxvi.  The study reported here represents
an exploratory, qualitative investigation into 3PL contracts, whose primary motivation
is informing subsequent theory building case study research into such contracts.
In building theory, theoretical sampling governs case selection; it is appropriate to
choose cases that vary along the dimension(s) of emerging theoretical importance, while
controlling for other possibly confounding dimensionsxvii.   A manufacturer or marketer
might enter into just one contract with a service provider but that provider will likely be
engaged in the provision of 3PL services for several clients simultaneously.  Hence, a
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logical starting point for case study research into 3PL contracts would be to examine
various contracts in which the selfsame service provider is engaged concurrently.
Consequently, in the present investigation, we focus on contracts that all involve a
certain logistics service provider in New Zealand, which for reasons of confidentiality
we refer to as Theta.  Thus, insofar as we focus on the perspective of a provider of
services rather than of its client(s), our study is similar to Leahy, Murphy, and Poistxviii.
The approach of Leahy, Murphy, and Poist towards data gathering was markedly
deductive: they first compiled a list of 25 determinants of successful 3PL alliances
based on a review of the literature in academic and practitioner journals, and then
elicited rankings of only those 25 determinants (without regard for any factors from
outside the list that respondents might have considered relevant).  On the other hand,
our approach towards data gathering and analysis is marked considerably by induction.
The ‘products’ of our induction include concepts and categories that are relevant in the
study of 3PL contracts.  Our approach contrasts with that of, for instance, Zinn and
Parasuramanxix who rather deductively formulate dimensions of contracts such as scope
(measured through the number of services included in the alliance) and intensity
(measured by the extent of direct involvement between alliance partners).
Our focus on a single 3PL service provider is not at odds with the purport of the present
study, which is to engender theoretical insight into the behaviour of 3PL contracts.
Besides, since the unit of analysis in the present study is the contract, a ‘single’ provider
actually includes several cases within its fold.
The present paper is organized as follows.  The ensuing section details the qualitative
methodology employed in the present investigation, with an emphasis on the inductive
process of analysis.  We then describe the primary product of our analysis, which, in
essence, is an anatomy of 3PL contracts, replete with the constituent elements and their
relationship to each other as well as to the whole.  These findings of our study are
tantamount to a rigorous, first-order, conceptual cat gorization of the qualitative data
on-hand.  We then conclude the paper with what approaches a second-order
interpretation of the data, namely, a discussion of how the present investigation, at
large, informs empirical research into 3PL contracts.
Methodology
Iterative data gathering
The issue of what constitutes an appropriate degree of theoretical formulation prior to
data gathering in qualitative research has been debated upon at length, with one set of
authors, including Loflandxx among others, holding that ideally, data collection should
be commenced from a ‘blank state.’  For reasons similar to those adduced by Miles and
Hubermanxxi, we followed their recommendation of commencing data collection with a
rudimentary conceptual framework of sorts.   In our context, a ‘mundane’ reasonxxii for
doing so was that the principal source of data was interviews with a senior executive
(SE) of Theta.  To minimize our imposition on his time and to simultaneously ‘get the
most’ out of the interviews, we saw fit to do some prior ‘homework.’   This took the
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form of, among other things, a stock-take of all references to the effectiveness of 3PL
contracts in the extant academic literature, as well as the business press in New Zealand.
As it happened, our first introduction to the SE had been at a formal presentation by him
on Theta’s business and its various, ongoing 3PL contracts in New Zealand.  Thus, his
presentation suggested issues and topics that we could probe further in research
interviews.  For instance, in the course of his presentation, the SE had dwelt a little upon
two of Theta’s larger contracts that, as it happened, respectively involved two non-
competing groups of companies in the FMCG sector in New Zealand, Alpha and Beta.
Given our focus on the effectiveness of 3PL contracts, an issue that naturally emerged
for subsequent probing was: did Theta consider the one contract to be more successful
than the other and if so, how and for what reason(s)?  (However, it subsequently turned
out that the two seemingly similar contracts stood in rather an ‘apples-and-oranges’
relation to each other, thus rather voiding the question.)
The SE was himself, in the aforesaid manner, a major source of issues for discussion for
even the first interview; this accentuated the inductive character of our methodology.
Moreover, immediately prior to the first interview, the SE gave us a guided tour of the
Beta site, during which he described at length various aspects of Theta’s business.  In
turn, the site-visit fed into the first interview.
The imperative of ‘going back-and-forth’ between incipient conceptual frameworks and
data gathering is a hallmark of the grounded theory approachxxiii.  Thus, after the first
interview with the SE, we coded the interview transcript along the lines proposed by
Rosexxiv, which is quite similar to, for example, the open coding logic of Strauss and
Corbinxxv.  In keeping with our constant endeavour to understand the ‘how?s’ and
‘why?s’ concerning 3PL contracts, we also compiled a new set of issues to probe based
on the first interview.  Then, in the subsequent interview, we sought to explore these
issues as well as to ‘fill’ (and modify, if necessary) the concepts and categories that
were emerging from our coding.  This process was repeated until we appeared to reach
closure with regard to our c nceptualization of 3PL contracts, which we present
subsequently in the paper.
Other sources of data for the present study included documents furnished by the SE.
These included a list of the various KPI’s (key performance indices) used by Theta,
copies of partnering agreements (such as the one between Theta on the one hand, and
Alpha and its two sister companies in New Zealand on the other), and statements of
contracts.
We now present a concrete illustration of our approach towards data gathering for
clarifying the same.  During the first interview, the SE had remarked that Theta
employed open book costing in its contract with Beta.  Alpha, after starting out with
open book costing, subsequently sought merely a variable-cost-per-carton figure from
Theta, which the SE remarked was a “definite” indication of its growing trust in Theta.
This begged the question as to whether Alpha trusted Theta more than Beta did (perhaps
because Alpha’s contract was the older of the two).  We duly probed this issue
subsequently.  The SE responded that Beta’s continued use of open book costing
proceeded more from its history of gross in-house mismanagement of the warehouse
when “there were huge cartels of people doing dodgy things” such as pilferage.
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Our coding process
Before we describe our coding process, we set out some definitions.  A concept is a
pattern that emerges from the data.  An indicator is an empirical phenomenon that fits
into a concept.  A category is an abstract idea that unifies several concepts.
During coding, we scanned the text (.g., interview transcripts) from start to finish, all
the while searching for various patterns or themes that began to manifest in the data and
that evinced the potential for subsequent recurrence in manifold ways; each such
manifestation constituted an indicator of the underlying pattern (concept).  To illustrate
our coding process, we reproduce below a snippet from one of the interviews, wherein
“A” refers to the authors.
1 A: You manage Gamma’s warehouse and so forth but how does Theta win with a
2 contract such as Gamma, wherein, because of the nature of Gamma’s product
3 (XXXX), you cannot consolidate distribution as you might with, say, Beta’s
4  products?
5 SE:Gamma is a contract that we took on under the impression that it would extend
6 its product range, and deliver to other outlets. This did not come about.
7 A: Did this change your business plan?
8 SE:Yes.  It [Gamma] is a small xxx-dollar contract. We will only get a win out of it
9 if it changes to a multipurpose [warehouse].
In lines 5-6 of the snippet, we discern a potential concept (theme), one that appears
likely to recur severally.  We label it ‘premises/assumptions in the client’s business plan
that underlie the provider’s acceptance of the contract.’  Two indicators of this concept
are: ‘the client’s plans to extend its product range’; and ‘the client’s plans to expand its
customer base.’  Continuing further, in lines 8-9, we discover another emergent concept,
Theta gets a win out of a contract’; an indicator of the same is
‘operating the contract out of a multipurpose warehouse.’
Such emergent concepts will be ‘filled’ upon the analysis of subsequent text, failing
which they will be explored through subsequent data gathering.  In the manner of the
constant comparisons methodxxvi, upon the gathering and analysis of subsequent data, a
concept could well be redefined/relabeled, perhaps as not one but several (lower-level)
concepts.  It is vital to ensure that at all times, each one of the indicators of a concept
truly constitutes a manifestation of the pattern/theme that is referred to by the concept’s
label.  Thus, not only should the indicators of a concept cohere with the label that is
assigned to the concept, the various indicators should stand in relation to each other as
being different representations of the selfsame pattern/theme.
We clarify this process with reference to another snippet, wherein, to avoid confusion
with the preceding extract, the lines are numbered starting from 101.
101 A: Do all contracts have an initial duration of three years?
102 SE:They vary. It depends on a number of things...  With Beta, it was originally a
103 three year contract. We have invested in the paperless [warehousing] system, and
104  an expensive computer system. We renegotiated the contract for a further length of
105 time on the basis that we have made an investment and we need some ROI on this
106 investment. Where we don’t spend a lot of capital, the shortest term is three years.
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107 Like Gamma. A normal contract is three to five years. We had a five year contract
108 with Delta and after 3 years this has been extended to be renewed to the year 2002.
109 They have extended this out as they have been happy with the way the contract has
110 been working
In lines 104-106, we uncover a concept relating to renegotiation, which we label
‘drivers for renegotiating the contract duration,’ of which one indicator is ‘the
provider’s making an investment and needing some ROI.’  Proceeding further, it
appears, at first glance, that in lines 107-110, this concept is manifesting again as ‘the
client’s being satisfied with the way the contract has been working.’  However, while
the first indicator refers to a driver from the provider’s side, the second refers to a driver
from the client’s side.  Hence, the emergent concept is redefined as two lower-level
provider’s drivers for renegotiating the length of the contract,’ and ‘client’s
drivers for renegotiating the length of the contract.’
As happens quite often in inductive research of the present kind, some of the concepts
that are induced echo those that have been developed (perhaps somewhat deductively)
in the literature, while some others have not been expressed extensively.  For the sake of
illustration, we present below the indicators (in itemized form, and in italics) of three
major concepts (whose labels are in boldface).  The first concept has been well
addressed in its own right in the literature in the context of decision drivers ( ee for
example, Coyle, Bardi, and Langleyxxvii, and Rao and Youngxxviii), while the second and
third, though significant, have not.  All quotations are of the SE verbatim.
Impetuses to the client for going into contract logistics.
· Difficulties with managing logistics in-house.  (For instance, at Beta, as noted
earlier, pilferage was a serious problem.  At Gamma, “the warehouse was a mess”;
the available space was poorly utilized requiring Gamma to occasionally use outside
storage at considerable expense.  Omega had had “a whole lot of owner drivers that
were making a lot of money.”  In the Australian beer industry, unions are strong and
“the ability to save money in terms of some of the costs may not be as important as
the ability to keep the business running [without strikes].”)
· The practice of allied firms overseas to go in for contract logistics.  (The American
owners of Gamma were employing contract logistics in the US, and hence wished to
explore it in New Zealand.)
· The intent of the parent group of companies to use the client subsidiary as a ‘pilot’
to test out contract logistics.  (At the time our study commenced, a prominent
Australasian group of companies trialled contract logistics in New Zealand with
Theta for one of its newly acquired subsidiaries, Omega.)
· The special expertise of the provider.  (Theta’s special capabilities in the transport of
food products, as well as its ability to move product in accordance with the changing
needs of the market [“flexible walls”], were the main reasons the aforementioned
client-subsidiary approached Theta.)
The provider’s ways of refraining from making firm and strong monetary
commitments early in the contract negotiations.
· Premising that it is not knowledgeable enough: “The first thing we do when we go
into a new contract is point out that we don’t understand your business.  That’s the
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· Stipulating conditions/qualifications while presenting budgets: “under certain
conditions”; “based on these premises”; “given what we think”; “based on what we
; etc.
· Giving only ball-park estimates, “indicative costs.”
· Giving distant time-frames for cost reduction: “We will say to people ‘year one is
not a time for saving money.’  …We normally say in terms of the contract year one
is the cost consolidation and year two is where we look at costs coming down. It
depends on the nature of the contract of course.  Whether you take over existing
staff.  We may have an initial capital investment to buy new vehicles, etc.”
· Focusing on possibilities: “Here are the things we can do for your business to save
The above concept is related to yet another, namely:
Reasons for which the provider refrains from making firm and strong
monetary commitments early in the contract negotiations.
· Lack of complete information from the client.  (In r sponse to a suggestion by us, the
SE heartily agreed [“too right”] that during initial negotiations, some clients would
cite only selective cost components and express a desire to see the ‘total cost’ come
down from their current estimate through the tsourcing of logistics.  It was then
incumbent upon Theta to systematically ascertain all the relevant costs before
suggesting what improvements might ensue.)
· Intrinsic difficulty.  (“We get a lot of people asking us to quote on their business on
the basis that they give us some figures and ask us how we are going to improve for
them.  It is an absolute impossibility for us to go to people and say this is what we
will do your business for.  There are so many variables in any usiness that affect
the costs.  We refuse to get into the area of ‘ticking the boxes’ or ‘our cost’ versus
‘your cost.’  There is nothing more certain than we will get it wrong.”)
· Exposure to risk.  (“We pulled out of a tender for ZZZ because they had a xxx-
million dollar inflexible budget.  We might have made money but there was a great
opportunity to lose our shirt as well.”)
The above two concepts are unified by the (higher-level) category, ‘refraining from
making firm and strong commitments regarding costs early in the negotiations,’ of
which the first concept comprises ‘ways of refraining,’ and the second concept
comprises ‘reasons for refraining.’  This category is closely related to the avoidance of
Gulisanoxxix cites as a fault of providers that results in failures.
Findings
In the manner described in the preceding section, we first induced lower-level concepts
and subsequently, higher-level categories that represented greater degrees of
abstraction.  We now present the products of our induction, which taken together,
constitute an anatomical description of 3PL contracts.  We emphasiz  that inasmuch as
the description has been rigorously induced from the available data, it is empirically
solidly grounded.
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A conceptualization of third party logistics contracts
The concepts and categories that we have induced from the data can be grouped into
four major categories.   These we have labeled as follows.
1. The prelude.  This pertains to the ‘coming into being’ of the contract, and includes
the origination and initial multilateral negotiations.
2. The physical ctualization/realization of the contract.  This relates to the direct,
concrete, and ongoing physical manifestation of the contract and includes, but is not
limited to, the logistical services that are provided therein.
3. The multi-lateral management of the contract.  This refers to the indirect,
managerial planning and controlling of the contract/alliance/relationship.
4. The context embedding the contract.  This relates to influences on the contract that
are not intrinsic to any one of the preceding (namely, the prelude, the physical
actualization, and the management of the contract) but rather permeate through them
all.
The categories along with their included concepts are presented in the appendix.  Each
concept/category is accompanied with an indicator that is contained in the data and that
serves to clarify its definition.
While the concepts that are included within each category in the appendix are an
illustrative subset of those that we uncovered, they nevertheless suffice to sharpen the
definition of the same.  The four categories and their relationship to each other are also
pictorially depicted in Figure 1.
We now compare and contrast the conceptualization depicted in Figure 1 to the buying
process of Sink and Langleyxxx and to the three-phase process model of logistics
alliances proposed by Bagchi and Virumxxxi.  In the latter, phase 1 is characterised by a
“growing awareness of the need for a radical change in the management of the logistics
function,” phase 2 consists of the “preparation and planning for the alliance,” and phase
3 includes “managing the process.”  Further, as with Sink and Langley’s buying
process, adjustment feedback loops from phase 3 to the pr ceding phases can prevail in
Bagchi and Virum’s process model.
The ‘prelude’ in Figure 1 roughly corresponds to the first three steps in the buying
process and to phase 1 in the process model.  However, in our conceptualization, the
multi-lateral management of the contract and the physical actualization are, more or
less, concurrent processes.  The two stand roughly in a first-order/second-order,
direct/indirect relation to each other.
The method by which either the five-step buying process or the three-phase process
model has been inferred from the associated data is not transparently clear.  For
example, Bagchi and Virum note merely that “the logic of dividing the process into
three phases emerged from the findings of the case studies.”xxxii  We submit that, in
contrast, the anatomy depicted in Figure 1 has been rigorously and systematically
grounded in empirical data through recourse to formal techniques of inductive analysis
of qualitative data.
An Inductive Empirical Investigation into Third Party Logistics Contracts
Sankaran & Charman
9
We also note that Figure 1 makes explicit the notion of ‘context.’  While the context
that embeds a contract and shapes it may not be intrinsic to the contract per s, the
effectiveness of a contract will have to be construed with reference to contextual
variables, such as ‘flux within the client company and in its environment’ (see the
appendix).  In fact, the impact of a manufacturer’s operating environment on the
formation of cooperative logistics relationships by it is the very focus of Stank and
Daughertyxxxiii.
Using the conceptual framework
In her discussion of data analysis in case study research, Eis nh rdtxxxiv distinguishes
between within case analysis and cross case analysis, the former logically preceding the
latter.  Within-case analysis “typically involves detailed case-study write-ups for each
site,” while cross-case analysis involves a “search for patterns” across cases, which is
accomplished through a variety of tacticsxxxv.
We envisage that the conceptual framework of 3PL contracts described earlier will
serve as a handy blueprint for developing in-depth case descriptions (within case
analysis).  Thus, a case write-up on a contract could proceed along four lines, namely,
the prelude, the (direct) physical actu ization, the (indirect) joint management of the
contract, and the embedding context.  The concepts within each of these four major
categories can be used as a basis for the collection and organization of data.
The resulting descriptions will be fairly consistent across contracts.  This feature is
important for at least two reasons.  First, it facilitates cross case comparisons in an
obvious way.  Second, it conduces joint research by multiple investigators who can
develop case descriptions, independently of each other, with little loss of coherence in
the investigation.
Conclusion And Discussion
We have reported an inductive, qualitative investigation into 3PL contracts with a view
to informing subsequent case study research into their effectiveness and the
Prelude
(Ongoing) physical actualization
(Ongoing) multilateral management
Context
Figure 1.  A pictorial conceptualization of third party logistics contracts.
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determinants thereof.  To this end, we have, among other things, developed a
conceptualization of 3PL contracts by dissecting qualitative data that has been gathered
principally through flexible interviews.  From the data, besides inducing this anatomy,
we have drawn various inferences that could be borne in mind during subsequent
empirical research into 3PL contracts.  Below, we discuss them by turn.
The provider’s perspective of contract success
The effectiveness of a contract/alliance should perhaps be related to the extent to which
each party/signatory perceives it to be a win for itself, as opposed to the extent to which
only the client manufacturer/marketer sees it as a win.  (The user-centrism that is latent
in empirical research on third-party logistics has been pointed out by Leahy, M rph ,
and Poist as being “somewhat curious, in part because one of the distinguishing features
of third-party logistics involves the long-term, mutually beneficial relationships between
users and providers of third-party services.”xxxvi)  Gamma “seem perfectly happy” with
Theta because “we have added value into their operation through the implementation of
KPI recording and those sorts of things..., the biggest benefit being they no longer have
to concentrate resources on running a warehouse.”  However, Theta do s not see it as a
win for itself because the consolidation of distribution that had been envisaged when the
contract was signed, did not materialise.
From the provider’s perspective, current performance alone may not be a sufficient
criterion to distinguish highly successful contracts from less successful contracts; the
prospects for business growth to the provider that stem from the contract also have to be
reckoned with.  Theta’s contract with Omega had several teething problems due to
serious differences of opinion at the start: “In all of our negotiations with Omega, we
expressed concern over the vehicle configuration they wished us to use.  We spent a lot
of time telling them how we thought they should do business (because I knew
something about their business).  They wanted to do it their way so we made it clear we
didn’t think it would work.  We wrote the issues down [in the contract]... and it became
However, Theta hung on (“we had to do it their way”) because it saw “long-term value”
in the contract.  As mentioned earlier, Omega’s parent company was trialing contract
logistics through Omega.  Theta potentially stood to gain the business of Omega’s sister
companies in due course.  Thus, although Omega’s contract was not more profitable
than Gamma’s contract to Theta in the short-run, Theta viewed the former far more
favourably due to the prospects of “organic growth” that it afforded.  In light of this, the
NPV of contracts (which incorporates future growth prospects) might be a better basis
for gauging the benefit from a contract to the service provider.
This last point perhaps has to be interpreted in light of the difficulties in achieving scale
economies and business growth in a country such as New Zealand.  While New Zealand
has a landmass that is eight percent larger than that of the UK, its population is just one-
sixteenthxxxvii.  In 1996, two-thirds of the manufacturing activity units in New Zealand
employed five or fewer full-time equivalent (FTE) persons, and the average number of
FTE persons engaged per unit was less than a dozen!xxxviii  Further, in that year, the
average annual sales and other income of a manufacturing unit were NZD 2.33 million.
Thus, by international standards, New Zealand’s manufacturing is quite small-scale.
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The scope of 3PL contracts
Our data also suggest a modification to the 2x2 conceptualization of 3PL alliances of
Zinn and Parasuraman, wherein, as mentioned earlier, the one dimension is scop, and
the other is intensity.xxxix  Zinn and Parasuraman characterise a focused alliance by the
3PL provider’s strong commitment of resources to implement, and perform on an
ongoing basis, a limited number of services.  For example, the 3PL provider may
provide dedicated warehouse space in an expensive area.  According to Zinn and
Parasuraman, this suggests high financial commitment but low scope, i.e., the 3PL
provider may only provide the warehouse and not other aspects of logistics such as
transportation.
The data from Theta (as does the conceptualization of alliances) indicate that the
(indirect) management of a contract must be distinguished from the (direct) services
provided as per the contract.  Speaking of Phi, one of Theta’s flagship contracts, the SE
remarked: “We manage the warehouse and we manage their [Phi’s] transport contract.
The reason we do that is the distribution has been excellent in the past so why c ange a
good thing.  What we did insist though is that we manage him [the proprietor of the
freight company].  There is nothing worse than managing the warehouse and getting
things done and having no one to pick it up.  There is a very strong link between timings
in warehousing and transport.  It was important to us that we took a lot of time in
talking to this guy...”
Phi is the New Zealand subsidiary of an Australian food manufacturer that has closed
down manufacturing facilities in New Zealand.  The above quotation underscores the
well-known principle of integrated logistics that mandates close co-ordination between
transportation, warehousing, and other logistically related activities.xl  In light of it,
scope is perhaps better measured through the number of services included in the alliance
that are either (directly) provided and/or (indirectly) managed.
Selection of contracts for case study research
In the nearly eight years that Theta has provided 3PL services in New Zealand, not one
of its contracts have been terminated by either the client or T ta.  Our findings suggest
that the ‘thoroughness’ of the contract logistics service provider is a major determinant
of contract success and manifests, for instance, in the avoidance of “
in the insistence on managing the client’s freight contract (e.g., the Phi contract of
Theta).
Vincent Gulisano, whose company USCO on one occasion “overpromised” on the basis
of insufficient data, corroborates this perspective: “…we relied on spreadsheets to tell
the story…  We won the contract but the relationship failed – the first major failure
within our company in nearly 30 years.  The fault rested squarely on our shoulders.  Our
mistake was in not insisting that we understand every aspect of the operation.”xli
Gulisano explains USCO’s lack of understanding of the client’s operation thus: “We
were not allowed to tour the existing facility.  We couldn't speak to upper management
or warehouse managers…  The client did not want to offer information that might
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influence our proposal or hurt contract negotiations.  They assumed we, the logistics
experts, should have the right answers.”
This implied need for “a high degree of communication and interaction between the
buying team and supplier personnel” is also highlighted by Sink and Langleyxlii in the
context of step 3 (“evaluate candidates and select supplier”) of their buying process.
One means of reconciling their findings with our data and USCO’s experience is that
the ‘service provider’s avoidance of overpromising’ is an instrumental cause of
effectiveness in outsourcing, and has as its antecedents, the thoroughness of the provider
during initial negotiations and/or Sink and Langley’s systematic buying procedure.
In light of the above, it appears that for the purpose of gaining theoretical insight into
contract effectiveness, one could perhaps compare contracts that correspond to different
service providers.  For strategic reasons, manufacturers and mark ters that are in direct
competition with each other seldom employ the same provider.  (Thus, for example,
Theta has eschewed contracts with certain Australasian marketers in New Zealand in the
hope of securing contract(s) with their [larger] competitors.)  Hence, theory is probably
well built by comparing contracts entered into by direct competitors (with different
providers).  The choice of direct competitors will help control for the influence of
product-type and affiliated attributes on contract effectiveness.  For example, Theta
finds it difficult to effect consolidation in transport while servicing Gamma’s contract
because Gamma is a marketer of XXXX, which are rather “messy” to handle and ship:
“You cannot put XXXX and food on the same truck.”
We will follow up on the present study through case study research into 3PL contracts.
Rather than employ the classification of Z n and Parasuramanxliii as a basis for case
(contract) selection, we will, in keeping with our inductively derived findings, compare
and contrast Theta’s contract with Gamma with another contract involving a different
service provider and a competing marketer of identical product.
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Appendix
An anatomy of 3pl contracts
Note: Categories are labeled in bold-face, concepts are l b led in italics, and lower-
level concepts (and indicators of concepts) are bulleted.  (Indicators of lower-level
concepts are asterisked.)
Prelude (inception and initial negotiations).
- Impetuses to the client for going for the contract.
· Difficulties with managing logistics in-house.
- Reasons for the provider’s entering into the contract.
· “An opportunity to expand the XXX side of our operation [those aspects of the
provider’s business which it does quite well].”
- Factors determining the length of the initial contract.
· The amount of capital investment.  (“XXX is a ten year contract because we
bought their real estate.  Where we don’t spend a lot of capital, the shortest term
- Premises/assumptions in the client’s business plan that underlie the provider’s
acceptance of the contract.
· The client’s plans to extend its product range.
- Ways by which the provider sells its custom to the client.
· Recommendations by existing clients: “one of the selling points we try and
stress is please go and talk to our customers about the things we do for them.”
- Provider’s recommendations that are rejected by the client but upheld in hindsight.
· Vehicle configuration.  (“Omega wanted a very low operation [in terms of the
positioning of the doors and the sizes of the wheels and tyres]...  We made it
clear we didn’t think it would work...  The current tyres wear out twice as fast.”)
Physical actualization of the contract.
- Services provided by the third party operator.
· Issues related to warehousing.
* Policies concerning existing warehouse staff in the client company.
- Idiosyncratic complications in serving the client.
· Odd shape of product.  (“The Gamma system is a cold pressed XXXX system so
some of the products are square bits of rubber rather than round bits of rubber.
There is an added difficulty in moving square and round stuff together.”)
- Kinds of capital investment made by the third party provider.
· A paperless warehousing system.
- Ways in which the provider gets a ‘win’ from the contract.
· Consolidation of distribution with other clients.
- Benefits to the client from the contract.
· Freeing up of resources.  (“The biggest benefit being they [Gamma] no longer
have to concentrate resources on running a warehouse.”)
- Ways by which the provider ‘adds value’ to the client’s business.
· The recording of KPI’s.
- Kinds of evolution/growth in an alliance.
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· Growth in the product range.  (“With XXX, we began just doing dry goods in
the North Island [of New Zealand], we now do all their goods and are looking at
the South Island.)
- Means of increasing asset utilization.
· Seeking other clients whose demands are counter-seasonal with existing
client(s).
Multi-lateral management of the contract.
- Reasons for the provider’s persistence with a contract that is performing less than
optimally and/or not living up to its promise/initial expectations.
· Credibility: “We don’t want to lose credibility by taking someone on and saying
‘thanks very much, see you later,’ we would never do that in a million years.”
- Criteria for gauging the profitability of a contract to the provider.
· ROI.
- Agenda for periodic meetings/reviews.
· Examining strategic options: “Look at the strategic things they [e.g., Beta] and
we are doing.”
- Types of costing mechanisms.
· Open book costing.  (“We show the clients an operating statement every month
which shows all costs and revenues.  We give them the total picture.    They
know how much our margins are. They know all the various cost components.”)
- Factors influencing the client’s choice of costing mechanism and/or operating
statements.
· Facilitation of business planning.  (“With Alpha, we have gone back [from an
‘open book’ regime] to a point now of splitting everything up into a unit rate
because of how costs have changed over time.  We still show them operating
statements but it suits their business to work under the unit rate scenario.  They
know how much each unit rate is so they can relate this back to their sales costs
and product costs.”)
- Reasons for entering into a formal partnering agreement, where applicable.
· Major changes in the supply chain.  (“The reason for the partnering agreement
with Alpha’s parent company was that there were a lot of issues  that affected
distribution, that were outside of the distribution area.  They were moving
manufacturing sites.  There were three different operations...”)
- Ways in which the client exhibits trust in the provider’s management of the contract.
· The client’s dispensing with open book costing (e.g., Alpha).
- Provider’s drivers for renegotiating the duration of the contract.
· The provider’s making an investment and needing some ROI.
- Client’s drivers for renegotiating the duration of the contract.
· The client’s being satisfied with the way the contract has been working.
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